10 years after Lehman Brothers fall
Banking is in a process of transformation impinged by deep technological and regulatory changes. This process has coincided with the recovery from the Great Recession out of the financial crisis and with a subsequent long period of very low (or even negative) interest rates. The regulatory response to the crisis is still not completed, digital technology is starting to have a large impact, and the banking industry faces deep structural changes.
The session, 10 years after Lehman Brothers fall will try to answer the question:
Has banking regulatory reform run its course?
Professors Patrick Bolton (Columbia and Imperial College), Jean-Pierre Danthine (Lausanne), and Stephen G. Cecchetti (Brandeis), together with IESE’s Professor Xavier Vives will deal with such issues as whether the increase in capital and liquidity requirements will promote lending by banks, whether the new regulations will prevent the failure of systemic banks, would Lehman Brothers fall again in the new context?, have banks and its regulation changed enough, do we have the tools to deal with the failure of a large bank (e.g. Popular)? should the Central Bank be responsible for the stability of the financial system or it should try to control inflation only?
Prof. Patrick Bolton, David Zalaznick Professor of Business Columbia Business School
Prof. Stephen G. Cecchetti, Rosen Family Chair in International Finance, Brandeis International Business School
Prof. Jean-Pierre Danthine, Economist and Leader in an International Environment
Speaker and Moderator
Prof. Xavier Vives, Professor of Economics and Finance, Abertis Chair of Regulation, Competition and Public Policy, and Academic Director of the Public-Private Research Center at IESE
Holder, Abertis Chair of Regulation, Competition and Public Policy / Academic Director, Public-Private Sector Research Center (SP-SP)Xavier Vives is professor of Economics and Finance, Abertis Chair of Regulation, Competition and Public Policy, and academic director of the Public-Private Research Center at IESE Business School. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from UC Berkeley.<P>He is Research Fellow of CESifo, and was member of its European Economic Advisory Group from 2001 to 2011. Research Fellow of the Center for Economic Policy Research, where he served as Director of the Industrial Organization Program in 1991-1997. Fellow of the Econometric Society since 1992 and elected member of its Council in 2006-2008; of the European Economic Association since 2004 and elected member of its Council 1991-1995; and Research Associate of the European Corporate Governance Institute. He is a member of the Advisory Board for Economic Recovery of the Government of Catalonia and in 2011 he was appointed Special Advisor to the Vicepresident of the European Commission and Commissioner for Competition, Mr Joaquín Almunia.<P>From 2001 to 2005 he was Professor of Economics and Finance and The Portuguese Council Chaired Professor of European Studies at INSEAD, and from 1991 to 2001, Director of the Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica, CSIC. He has taught at Harvard University, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Pennsylvania, and New York University (King Juan Carlos I Chair). From 2003 until 2013, he was member of the Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy at the European Commission.<P>His fields of interest are industrial organization and regulation, the economics of information, and banking and financial economics. He has published in the main international journals and is the author of <i>Information and Learning in Markets: the Impact of Market Microstructure</i> (Princeton University Press, 2008), <i>Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools</i> (MIT Press, 1999), editor of <i>Competition Policy in Europe: Fifty Years on from the Treaty of Rome</i> (OUP, 2009), <i>Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation</i> (CUP, 2000), and co-editor of <i>Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation</i> (CUP, 1993). He has been editor of the <i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> in 1993-1997, of the <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> in 1998-2008 and currently he is editor of the <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> and co-editor of the <i>Journal of Economics and Management Strategy</i>.<P>His current research interests include dynamic rivalry, innovation and competition, banking crisis and regulation, information and financial markets, and competition policy.<P>He has received several research awards: King Juan Carlos I Prize in 1988; the Catalan Society for Economics Prize in 1996; the Narcís Monturiol Medal in 2002; the Catalonia Economics Prize in 2005; an European Research Council Advanced Grant in 2008, and the Jaime I Prize in Economics in 2013. He is member of the Institut d?Estudis Catalans since 2011 and of the Academia Europaea since 2012.<P>Dr. Vives has been an advisor and consultant on competition, regulation, and corporate governance issues for the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the European Commission, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as well as for major international corporations. He is a member of the board and President of the Audit and Control Committee of CaixaBank. He is an occasional columnist for <i>La Vanguardia</i>, <i>El País</i>, <i>Project Syndicate</i>, <i>Vox</i>, <i>Financial Times</i> and <i>The Wall Street Journal</i>.
Patrick Bolton, Columbia and Imperial College
Patrick Bolton is the David Zalaznick Professor of Business. He joined Columbia Business School in July 2005. He received his PhD from the London School of Economics in 1986 and holds a BA in economics from the University of Cambridge and a BA in political science from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris. His research and areas of interest are in contract theory and contracting issues in corporate finance and industrial organization. A central focus of his work is on the allocation of control and decision rights to contracting parties when long-term contracts are incomplete. This issue is relevant in many different contracting areas including: the firm’s choice of optimal debt structure, corporate governance and the firm’s optimal ownership structure, vertical integration, and constitution design. His work in industrial organization focuses on antitrust economics and the potential anticompetitive effects of various contracting practices.
Stephen G. Cecchetti, Brandeis
Stephen G. Cecchetti is Rosen Family Chair in International Finance at the Brandeis International Business School. Before rejoining Brandeis in January 2014, he completed a five-year term as Economic Adviser and Head of the Monetary and Economic Department at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland. During his time at the Bank for International Settlements, Cecchetti participated in the numerous post-crisis global regulatory reform initiatives. This work included involvement with both the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Financial Stability Board in establishing new international standards.
Jean-Pierre Danthine, Lausanne
Jean-Pierre Danthine is a renowned economist and experienced leader in an international environment, Jean-Pierre Danthine was elected unanimously by the members of Paris School of Economics Board of Directors to become the new president of this young institution. Until 2009, he was a teacher and researcher in the Faculty of Business and Economics (HEC) at Lausanne University. He received his PhD at the Carnegie-Mellon University in 1976. In mid-2010, he joined the Executive Board of the Swiss National Bank, before becoming its vice-president from 2012 to the summer of 2015. In this same period, he managed the second department, in charge of financial stability, notes and coins, as well as finance and risks.